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9 Abstract
10 Human behavior is frequently described both in abstract, general terms and in concrete, specific terms. We asked
11 whether these two ways of framing equivalent behaviors shift the inferences people make about the biological and
12 psychological bases of those behaviors. In five experiments, we manipulated whether behaviors are presented concretely
13 (i.e. with reference to a specific person, instantiated in the particular context of that person’s life) or abstractly (i.e. with
14 reference to a category of people or behaviors across generalized contexts). People judged concretely framed behaviors
15 to be less biologically based and, on some dimensions, more psychologically based than the same behaviors framed in
16 the abstract. These findings held true for both mental disorders (Experiments 1 and 2) and everyday behaviors
17 (Experiments 4 and 5) and yielded downstream consequences for the perceived efficacy of disorder treatments
18 (Experiment 3). Implications for science educators, students of science, and members of the lay public are discussed.
19
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20Q2 Significance
21 In everyday life, we tend to frame behaviors in different
22 ways. Sometimes we talk about behavior in general terms
23 (e.g. some people stay calm in competitive situations; some
24 people lose pleasure in activities that they once enjoyed). At
25 other times, we talk about those same behaviors with
26 reference to particular people in the context of their lives
27 (e.g. Allen stayed calm during his figure-skating competi-
28 tion; Dan no longer takes pleasures in long country drives).
29 The question is whether these different kinds of descrip-
30 tions matter; that is, does framing affect the inferences we
31 make about those behaviors? Although these abstract and
32 concrete descriptions seem to essentially depict the same
33 behaviors, we found that the two levels of description lead
34 to different judgments about how to explain the behavior.
35 Across five studies, participants favored biological explana-
36 tions (e.g. brain chemistry; genetics) more for abstract de-
37 scriptions than for concrete cases and they favored some
38 psychological explanations (e.g. intentions; emotions) more
39 for concrete cases than for abstract descriptions. These
40shifts in people’s preferences occurred both for ordinary
41behaviors (e.g. Allen’s calm behavior) and mental disorder
42symptoms (e.g. delusions). As neuroscience and genetics
43research have increasingly been capturing the public’s at-
44tention, we argue that these results have important im-
45plications for science education and for public health
46communication.
47In the real world, unusual human behaviors (e.g. the
48symptoms of schizophrenia) are often described at one
49of two distinct levels of abstraction. At one level, behav-
50iors are described in the abstract, as generalized across
51individuals. For example, when we google the word
52“schizophrenia,” the websites that immediately come
53up—from the National Institute of Mental Health, Men-
54tal Health America, National Alliance for the Mentally
55Ill, Wikipedia, schizophrenia.com, and so on—provide
56abstract descriptions of schizophrenia and its symptoms
57(e.g. delusions). Abstract descriptions are also found
58when we search through an encyclopedia, dictionary, or
59medical handbook. At another level, we also talk about
60specific instances of the same behaviors (e.g. a woman
61who strongly believes that the next-door neighbor is her
62husband when in fact they have not met). One might
63learn about the concrete symptoms of schizophrenia via
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64 the depiction of a particular person in a film (e.g. A
65 Beautiful Mind; Howard, 2001), book (e.g. I Know This
66 Much Is True; Lamb, 2008), or magazine article about an
67 individual. One might also learn by observing such
68 symptoms first-hand in a friend or family member, or
69 hear about other specific cases by word of mouth.
70 Our central question is whether there is any effect of
71 the level of abstraction at which the behaviors are de-
72 scribed. Previous studies showed that concrete examples
73 affect judgments more strongly than abstract descrip-
74 tions do, because concrete examples are more salient,
75 memorable, or convincing (e.g. Borgida & Nisbett, 1977;
76 Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997; see also Semin & Fiedler,
77 1991 for different ways of construing abstract versus
78 concrete descriptions). In the current work, we ask
79 whether learning about behaviors in the abstract versus
80 from a concrete instance significantly shifts the kinds of
81 inferences laypeople then draw about the behavior. In
82 particular, we approach this question in terms of two dif-
83 ferent types of explanations for behaviors that are perva-
84 sive in lay discourse (as well as scientific): psychological
85 and biological explanations.
86 People often see human behaviors being explained in
87 terms of psychological constructs. For instance, one might
88 explain that a person has been feeling depressed because
89 she is under too much unrelenting stress at work. More
90 recently, as the field of neuroscience has rapidly pro-
91 gressed, people have also become familiar with biological
92 explanations for behaviors (O’Connor & Joffe, 2013). For
93 example, one could also explain that a person has been
94 feeling depressed due to a neurochemical imbalance. As
95 we will see in the next section, there are multiple possible
96 ways in which the level of abstraction at which behaviors
97 are depicted (i.e. abstractly or concretely) affects which
98 types of explanations (i.e. psychological and biological)
99 laypeople believe to be more plausible.
100 Relations between abstract versus concrete framing and
101 biological versus psychological explanations
102 We hypothesize that laypeople are relatively accepting of
103 biological explanations of behaviors in the abstract, but
104 are more reluctant to accept such explanations for the
105 behavior of concrete individuals. For instance, when con-
106 templating generalized anxiety disorder, laypeople may be
107 generally accepting of neurological or genetic exp-
108 lanations. Yet, when confronted with a particular concrete
109 individual with generalized anxiety disorder displaying
110 specific anxiety symptoms, people may be less inclined to
111 endorse biological explanations and instead explain that
112 individual’s symptoms as intentional or controllable. Such
113 findings could have considerable implications for public
114 health, given that judgments of intentionality or control-
115 lability are critical in driving stigma towards abnormal be-
116 haviors and the stigmatizing attitudes of others have
117enormous impact on treatment seeking, treatment avoid-
118ance, and benefits from treatment (e.g. Pescosolido,
119Martin, Lang, & Olafsdottir, 2008).
120A recent study found empirical support for a similar hy-
121pothesis in practicing mental health clinicians’ inferences
122about biological and psychological bases of symptoms of
123mental disorders (Kim, Ahn, Johnson, & Knobe, 2016).
124We found that hallmark symptoms of disorders described
125in the abstract led expert clinicians to endorse their bio-
126logical basis more strongly, and their psychological basis
127less strongly, than when the same symptoms were de-
128scribed concretely (i.e. in terms of individual cases). For
129instance, clinicians judged a disorder “characterized by
130loss of pleasure” involving “feeling a substantially dimin-
131ished interest in most activities, including activities found
132enjoyable in the past” to be more biologically caused than
133Dan’s problems of no longer showing “interest in most ac-
134tivities, no longer taking pleasure in golfing or long coun-
135try drives, even though these used to be some of his very
136favorite weekend activities.” In addition, clinicians were
137more likely to endorse the effectiveness of medication
138when they received the abstract description than when
139they received the concrete description, even though a pre-
140test verified that the two descriptions were judged to be
141essentially equivalent.
142However, it is unclear whether these findings are
143generalizable outside the population of clinicians and
144the domain of mental health. It is possible that clinicians
145are a special case, because in their intensive initial train-
146ing and continuing education, clinicians generally learn
147biological explanations for behavior in abstract form.
148Much like laypeople, clinicians frequently encounter psy-
149chological explanations in their ordinary concrete inter-
150actions, and in their training, clinicians are exposed to
151psychological evaluations of individual case studies in
152clinical practice and through client case formulations
153(Eells, Kendjelic, & Lucas, 1998). Importantly, however,
154clinicians are also exposed throughout their training to
155biological explanations through more abstract discussions
156in textbooks and research articles (e.g. describing new
157evidence for the neurochemical bases of schizophrenia).
158By contrast, laypeople have a great deal of concrete experi-
159ence with psychological explanation, but compared to
160clinicians, they typically have far less exposure to abstract
161discussions of biological explanation. One might therefore
162predict that laypeople would not show the effect observed
163among trained clinicians.
164One might even further argue that because psycho-
165logical states (e.g. intentions, stress) are not tangible in
166nature, laypeople may actually see them as being more
167abstract than biological states, which refer to tangible
168things such as the physical brain. Furthermore, from a
169reductionist viewpoint, biological explanations would be
170considered lower level explanations for behaviors than
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171 psychological explanations for the same behaviors.
172 Within the hierarchy of levels of explanation, psycho-
173 logical explanations are more abstract than biological
174 ones, being relatively lacking in concrete, physically
175 grounded detail (e.g. Dennett, 1971). As a result, lay-
176 people might find abstractly framed stimuli to be more
177 compatible with psychological construals of behaviors
178 than with biological construals.
179 Still, there are some potential reasons to expect that
180 the framing effects previously obtained with practicing
181 clinicians may turn out to reflect a broader, more gen-
182 eral phenomenon. First, in linguistics, a distinction is
183 made between generic statements (i.e. generalizations
184 that are made about entire categories of people or
185 things, such as “girls wear pink”) and non-generic state-
186 ments (i.e. statements that are not generic, such as de-
187 scriptions of specific individuals like “Mary wears pink;”
188 see Cimpian & Erickson, 2012). Studies suggest that lay-
189 people prefer to explain generics in terms of inherent
190 features (e.g. pink is delicate and girls are hardwired to
191 be attracted to it) rather than external features (e.g. it is
192 merely a societal convention for girls to wear pink; Cim-
193 pian & Salomon, 2014). In addition, biological properties
194 are perceived to be more permanent, immutable, and
195 timeless than psychological properties (e.g. Dar-Nimrod
196 & Heine, 2011; Haslam, Bastian, & Bissett, 2004). For in-
197 stance, the more that people with depression attribute
198 their symptoms to biological factors such as brain abnor-
199 malities or genes, the more pessimistic they are about
200 recovery (Lebowitz, Ahn, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2013).
201 Taken together, findings such as these suggest that bio-
202 logical explanations may seem more compatible with ab-
203 stract framing, which describes timeless patterns, than
204 with concrete framing, which describes transient events.
205 Second, psychological explanations may be more salient
206 to laypeople when a behavior is described concretely
207 than when it is described in the abstract. This idea is
208 supported by past work on people’s intuitions about free
209 will. When laypeople are told in the abstract about a
210 universe in which everything is fully determined, they
211 tend to say that no agent in this universe can be morally
212 responsible for his or her behavior, but when people are
213 told about one specific agent in the same deterministic
214 universe, they tend to say that this specific agent actually
215 is morally responsible (Nichols & Knobe, 2007). This ef-
216 fect arises because people reading a concrete case are
217 more inclined than are people reading about an abstract
218 case to think that the agent’s behavior was best ex-
219 plained by his or her psychological states (Murray &
220 Nahmias, 2014). Thus, concrete descriptions of individ-
221 ual agents performing specific actions may make psycho-
222 logical states (e.g. intentions, feelings) salient in a way
223 that more abstract descriptions do not (Nichols &
224 Knobe, 2007; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008).
225Overview of experiments
226The main goal of the current experiments was to exam-
227ine whether laypeople’s biological (and psychological)
228judgments are affected by the abstract versus concrete
229framing of behaviors and, if so, in what direction judg-
230ments are affected. We tested these hypotheses by meas-
231uring people’s endorsements of various biological and
232psychological explanations for behavior, across a range
233of equivalent abstract and concrete cases.
234There are many ways to manipulate the abstractness
235of behavior descriptions and many ways to determine
236which levels of abstractness should be of primary inter-
237est. We modeled our experimental manipulations on a
238distinction frequently encountered in the real world.
239The abstract version simulates general descriptions of
240behaviors; that is, these descriptions make reference to
241people exhibiting the behavior in general and describes
242behaviors in the abstract (e.g. coming up with strange
243beliefs that are contrary to fact and that persist strongly
244despite having no evidence to support them), as in no-
245sologies such as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
246of Mental Disorders (DSM-5, 5th ed., American Psychi-
247atric Association, 2013 Q3). The concrete version makes ref-
248erence to a particular person and describes behaviors as
249specifically instantiated in the context of that person’s
250life (e.g. Jenny has developed the strong belief that the
251man living next door is her husband), as in casebook
252training manuals for learning nosologies such as DSM-5
253Clinical Cases (Barnhill, 2013). This way of manipulating
254abstractness is the same as that deployed in Kim et al.’s
255(2016) study with clinicians, allowing us to compare the
256current results (Studies 1, 2, and 3) with those from
257experts in the domain. Unlike in Kim et al.’s (2016)
258study, however, we also used stimuli that are not symp-
259toms of mental disorders because of the current focus
260on laypeople rather than clinicians (Studies 4 and 5). For
261example, participants in our studies might read about ei-
262ther how some people stay calm during competitive situ-
263ations (abstract description described generally) or how
264Allen stayed calm during a figure-skating competition
265(concrete, individual case described within the specific
266context of that person’s life).
267Our prediction is that biological explanations are
268more strongly endorsed in the abstract than in the
269concrete, and that psychological explanations of be-
270havior are more strongly endorsed in concrete cases
271than in the abstract. That is, we would expect lay-
272people to think that brain chemistry, neural structure,
273and so on are better explanations of calm perform-
274ance in general than of Allen’s calm performance in
275particular. Conversely, we predict that explanations
276attributing calm performance to intentions or emo-
277tions would be endorsed more for Allen’s calm per-
278formance than for calm performance in general.
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279 We tested these predictions across five experiments.
280 Experiments 1 and 2 compared laypeople’s judgments of
281 the biological (and psychological) bases of various men-
282 tal disorders. Each disorder was described in a con-
283 cretely or abstractly framed vignette, judged by pretest
284 participants to be essentially equivalent. Experiment 3
285 tested whether these inferences have downstream conse-
286 quences for how people would choose to intervene on
287 disordered behavior—by using medication or by using
288 psychotherapy. Finally, Experiments 4 and 5 extended
289 these results beyond the domain of mental disorders,
290 examining lay judgments for behaviors that are uncom-
291 mon (and hence in need of explanation) but not the re-
292 sult of mental disorders.
293 Experiment 1
294 Experiment 1 tested whether laypeople’s causal attribu-
295 tions for disordered behavior are shifted by abstract versus
296 concrete framing. Although clinicians tend to view behav-
297 iors as more biologically based in the abstract than in the
298 concrete, and more psychologically based in the concrete
299 than in the abstract (Kim et al., 2016), it is unclear
300 whether this effect is largely induced by clinical training
301 and practice, or whether it would also extend to laypeople.
302 This question has considerable practical import, be-
303 cause laypeople’s attributions for mental disorders influ-
304 ence many outcomes of real-world importance. More
305 biological attributions for disordered behavior reduce
306 judgments of blame for symptoms (e.g. Corrigan &
307 Watson, 2004), but can increase essentialism (Haslam &
308 Ernst, 2002), leading to greater pessimism about recov-
309 ery (e.g. Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011; Lebowitz et al.,
310 2013). Furthermore, biological attributions for symptoms
311 are associated with the belief that medication is a more
312 effective treatment than psychotherapy (e.g. Iselin &
313 Addis, 2003; Luk & Bond, 1992; Yopchick & Kim, 2009).
314 The potential for abstract versus concrete framing to
315 affect such construals is a pressing issue in need of
316 examination, given that people frequently encounter
317 both abstract descriptions of disorder symptoms (e.g. on
318 WebMD) and concrete cases (e.g. their loved ones who
319 have disorder symptoms).
320 In addition, we probed the boundaries of this framing ef-
321 fect by asking participants about various types of biological
322 and psychological attributions. In previous work (Kim et al.,
323 2016), clinicians were asked to what extent the behaviors
324 are “biologically based” or “psychologically based” in gen-
325 eral, rather than about specific types of biological and psy-
326 chological causes. Yet, there are many different kinds of
327 both biological explanations (e.g. brain structure, genetics)
328 and psychological explanations (e.g. in terms of cognition,
329 emotion, or intentions). To what extent would shifts in at-
330 tributions generalize across these types of biological and
331 psychological causation? We tested these questions in
332Experiment 1 by asking participants to make judgments
333about several different types of biological and psychological
334causation for disordered behavior.
335Method
336Participants
337Fifty-one participants were recruited via Amazon Mech-
338anical Turk (see Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011).
339Eight were excluded from analysis (N = 3 due to taking
340similar studies in the past and N = 5 due to random re-
341sponses on filler items).
342Materials and pretest
343We selected six items, each a hallmark symptom of a
344well-known disorder in the DSM-IV-TR (American
345Psychiatric Association, 2000 Q4).1 For each item, we wrote
346an abstract version approximating the level of description
347in the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association,
3482000), and a corresponding concrete version detailing be-
349haviors exhibited by a specific person (approximating the
350level of description in the DSM-IV-TR Casebook; Spitzer,
351Gibbon, Skodol, Williams, & First, 2002). The two
352versions were roughly equated for length (see Table T11).
353Because we are testing the effect of abstract versus
354concrete framing of the same behavior, we recruited a
355separate group of 40 participants from Amazon Mech-
356anical Turk to complete a pretest, measuring whether
357the abstract and concrete version of each behavior cor-
358respond to each other. Each behavior was shown on a
359separate page and the two versions of each behavior, ab-
360stract and concrete, were presented side by side on the
361page. As an attention check, two filler items not de-
362signed to be equivalent were also included. Four partici-
363pants failed this check. Of the remaining 36 pretest
364participants, 15 judged whether the abstract version was
365“a good abstract description” of the concrete version on
366a scale of 1–9 (where 1 = a very poor description; 9 = a
367very good description), while 21 judged whether the
368concrete version was “a good example” of the abstract
369version on a scale of 1–9 (where 1 = a very poor ex-
370ample; 9 = a very good example). The mean rating for
371the “good abstract description” question was 7.97 (SD =
3720.30); the mean rating for the “good example” question
373was 8.21 (SD = 0.29). Mean ratings by item were all at
374least 7.60. Thus, these pretest results verified that each
375pair of abstract and concrete versions is fairly equivalent.
376For the main experiment, we added abstract and con-
377crete versions of two filler items (i.e. having an unusually
378large brain size; having a brain tumor) to allow for atten-
379tion and comprehension checks. If participants paid at-
380tention to the task, these filler items should receive very
381high ratings on biological questions and very low ratings
382on psychological questions. Five participants who did
383not show this pattern for the two filler items (i.e. giving
Kim et al. Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications _#####################_ Page 4 of 17
384 responses at least two standard deviations below the
385 mean on the biological questions [the average of Q1–3
386 below] or two standard deviations above the mean on
387 one of the sets of psychological questions [the average of
388 Q4–6 or Q7–9 below]) were excluded from the final
389 data analyses.
390 For the main experiment, nine questions were devel-
391 oped to measure people’s judgments of the biological
392 and psychological bases of behaviors. Three biological
393 questions were designed to probe beliefs about biological
394 causes of behaviors:
395 Q1. Do you think [their/her/his] brain chemistry is
396 different from that of people who [are not like this/do
397 not do this]?
398 Q2. Do you think [their/her/his] brain structures are
399 different from those of people who [are not like this/do
400 not do this]?
401 Q3. Do you think there is a genetic basis for this?
402 Because naïve biology is likely to be limited, only three
403 questions could be developed (e.g. additional questions re-
404 garding neuromodulators, etc., would not be meaningful if
405 laypeople did not have a strong intuitive understanding of
406 them). In contrast, because the existing literature suggests
407that naïve psychology encompasses a number of aspects
408of behavior (e.g. Malle & Knobe, 1997; Waytz, Gray, Epley,
409& Wegner, 2010), limiting the possible psychological ques-
410tions to three to match the number of biological questions
411would unnecessarily restrict the scope of the findings. Six
412questions were therefore gathered to probe beliefs in psy-
413chological causes of behaviors:
414Q4. Do you think this is caused by cognitive factors
415(e.g. [their/her/his] beliefs, knowledge, intelligence, or
416thinking style)?
417Q5. Do you think this is caused by [their/her/his]
418emotions and desires?
419Q6. Do you think this is caused by [their/her/his]
420[personalities/personality]?
421Q7. Do you think [they are/she is/he is] intentionally
422[like this/doing this]?
423Q8. Do you think [they/she/he] should be [held
424responsible for/given credit for] [being like this/doing this]?
425Q9. Do you think the causes of this are under [their/
426her/his] control?
427Q4, Q5, and Q6 (Psychological Set 1) were derived
428from tables of contents of Introductory Psychology text-
429books as factors that are frequently addressed in the
t1:1 Table 1 Stimuli for Experiments 1–3
t1:2 Item Text version
t1:3 Concrete Abstract
t1:4 1. Delusional
t1:5 thoughts and
t1:6 behaviors
Jenny has developed the strong belief that the man living next door
is her husband; she sometimes follows him when he is driving and
she sends hate mail to his actual wife, though she has never actually
met either of them in person.
This disorder is characterized by delusional thoughts and
behaviors; it involves coming up with strange beliefs that
are contrary to fact and that persist strongly, influencing
daily behaviors, despite having no evidence to support
them.
t1:7 2. Manic beliefs
t1:8 and behaviors
Eric effusively talks about his dozens of highly unrealistic business
ideas, which he thinks are guaranteed to make him millions of dollars;
he erroneously believes that he is irresistibly attractive to much
younger women and is oblivious to their rejections.
This disorder is characterized by manic beliefs and
behaviors; it involves holding extremely positive self-
views, which are often completely unfounded in reality,
and often talking excitedly about all of these beliefs,
despite the fact that they are untrue.
t1:9 3. Loss of
t1:10 pleasure
Dan no longer shows interest in most activities, no longer taking
pleasure in golfing or long country drives, even though these used to
be some of his very favorite weekend activities.
This disorder is characterized by loss of pleasure; it involves
feeling a substantially diminished interest in most activities,
including activities found enjoyable in the past.
t1:11 4. Repetitive,
t1:12 compulsive
t1:13 behaviors
Sarah locks each of her windows three times whenever she leaves her
house in order to prevent a burglary, she uses a new bar of soap
every time she washes her hands, and she runs a virus scan on her
computer every hour, even when her computer is disconnected from
the Internet.
This disorder is characterized by repetitive behaviors; it
involves feeling compelled to repeatedly engage in
behaviors aimed at preventing some dreaded event,
even though these behaviors are not a realistic means for
preventing what they are intended to prevent.
t1:14 5. Feelings of
t1:15 worthlessness/
t1:16 guilt
Chris believes that he is incompetent at his job, despite excellent
performance evaluations, and blames himself for his company’s recent
financial losses that were actually caused by uncontrollable
circumstances; when a busy co-worker passes by him without engaging
in a lengthy conversation, he thinks it is because he is inherently
unlikeable.
This disorder is characterized by feelings of worthlessness,
with unrealistically negative self-evaluations; it involves an
exaggerated sense of guilt and personal responsibility for
negative occurrences and interpreting neutral, day-to-day
events as evidence of personal defects, even though
these occurrences are not realistic reflections of poor
character.
t1:17 6. Recurrent
t1:18 nightmares
Mike has nightmares almost every night; he often dreams that he is a
passenger on an airplane that is out of control and about to crash, or
that he has been kidnapped by a serial killer who is planning to
torture him.
This disorder is characterized by frequent nightmares; it
involves having terrifying dreams more nights than not,
which often portray threats to physical safety and may
involve life-threatening situations.
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430 study of individual differences. Q7, Q8, and Q9 (Psycho-
431 logical Set 2) were derived from questions measuring be-
432 liefs about agency (e.g. Weiner, 1995, 2001).
433 Participants responded to these questions on scales of
434 1–7 (where 1 = not at all; 7 = definitely). For each version
435 of each behavior, the nine questions were presented in
436 randomized order across participants and across items.
437 For each item, participants completed the nine explan-
438 ation judgments on the same screen, with each item pre-
439 sented on a separate screen.
440 Procedure and design
441 All experiments were programmed using the online survey
442 software Qualtrics (Qualtrics Labs, Inc., Provo, UT, USA).
443 After reading a general overview of the task, each partici-
444 pant completed two blocks of items. Each block began with
445 a filler item, followed by the six disorders listed in Table 1,
446 with half of the disorders in the abstract version and half in
447 the concrete version, presented in a random order. The sec-
448 ond block contained the abstract versions of the concrete
449 items from the first block, and the concrete versions of the
450 abstract items from the first block. That is, participants
451 rated both the abstract and concrete versions of each item,
452 with the two versions in separate halves of the experiment
453 in a counterbalanced order. From the participants’ perspec-
454 tive, there was no obvious marking for filler items or
455 switching between blocks. Upon completing all items, par-
456 ticipants completed a dualism scale (Stanovich, 1989).
457 To summarize, the experiment incorporated a 2
458 (abstract or concrete) × 2 (psychological attributions
459 or biological attributions) within-subjects design.
460 Results
461 We first computed a biological score for each item by
462 averaging each participant’s responses to the three bio-
463 logical measures (Cronbach’s α = 0.97, calculated by item),
464 and a psychological score for each item by averaging each
465 participant’s responses to the six psychological measures
466 (α = 0.97).
467 We predicted that biological attributions would be
468 greater for the abstract version than for the concrete ver-
469 sion and that psychological attributions would be greater
470 for the concrete version than for the abstract version. To
471 test this, we conducted a 2 (concrete or abstract) × 2 (bio-
472 logical or psychological) repeated measures ANOVA on
473 each participant’s mean across items. This analysis revealed
474 the predicted interaction, F(1,42) = 95.68, p < 0.001, ηp
2 =
475 0.70, as shown in Fig.F1 1a. Biological attributions were higher
476 for the abstract versions (M = 5.37, SD = 1.23) than for the
477 concrete versions (M = 4.65, SD = 1.16), t(42) = −6.32, p <
478 0.001, d = −0.96, while psychological attributions were
479 higher for the concrete versions (M = 4.80, SD = 0.89) than
480 for the abstract versions (M = 3.70, SD = 0.99), t(38) = 10.85,
481 p < 0.001, d = 1.65.
482Figure 1b shows the 95% confidence intervals of the
483difference scores (concrete minus abstract) for each of
484the nine component measures. Each measure yielded a
485difference score that was significantly negative for all
486three biological measures, indicating a stronger prefer-
487ence for biological explanations in the abstract, and sig-
488nificantly positive for all six psychological measures,
489indicating a stronger preference for psychological expla-
490nations in the concrete.
491The interaction effect also held up in a by-item analysis,
492using each item’s mean score across participants. A 2 (ab-
493stract or concrete) × 2 (biological or psychological) repeated
494measures ANOVA on these scores revealed a significant
495interaction, F(1,5) = 17.32, p = 0.009, ηp
2 = 0.78. Biological at-
496tributions were higher for the abstract versions (M = 5.37,
497SD = 0.30) than for the concrete versions (M = 4.65, SD =
4980.89), t(5) = −2.58, p = 0.049, d = −1.05, while psychological
499attributions were higher for the concrete versions (M =
5004.80, SD = 0.95) than for the abstract versions (M = 3.70,
501SD = 0.44), t(5) = 5.04, p = 0.004, d = 2.06.
f1:1Fig. 1 Results of Experiment 1. a Judgments of the biological and
f1:2psychological bases of disordered behaviors rated within-subject; bars
f1:3depict Cousineau–Morey standard errors (Cousineau, 2005; Morey,
f1:42008). b The 95% confidence intervals of the difference scores
f1:5(concrete minus abstract) for ratings on the nine dependent measures.
f1:6“Biological Causes” in (a) are the averaged ratings of the first three
f1:7dependent measures listed in (b), and “Psychological (Sets 1 & 2)
f1:8Causes” are the averaged ratings of the last six dependent measures
f1:9listed in (b)
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502 Discussion
503 Experiment 1 found that biological attributions were
504 higher for abstract than concrete descriptions and psy-
505 chological attributions were higher for concrete than ab-
506 stract descriptions for the same behaviors. Remarkably,
507 although neither the abstract nor the concrete version
508 explicitly mentioned anything about the causes of the
509 behaviors, attributions were strongly affected by the
510 framing manipulation. Thus, not only expert clinicians
511 (Kim et al., 2016), but also laypeople, show an effect of
512 framing on their causal attributions for behavior. Further-
513 more, the effect occurred robustly across all measures we
514 used of psychological and biological attributions, suggest-
515 ing that it is quite broad.
516 Experiment 2
517 In Experiment 1, each participant made both biological
518 and psychological attributions. This design enabled us to
519 demonstrate shifts within the same individual, but it is
520 possible that participants may have felt experimenter de-
521 mand to rate the biological and psychological questions
522 in opposing directions. Experiment 2 therefore aimed to
523 replicate the finding using a between-subjects design;
524 that is, by having participants make only biological or
525 only psychological judgments.
526 Method
527 A total of 124 participants were recruited via Amazon
528 Mechanical Turk, of whom nine were excluded (N = 2
529 due to taking similar studies in the past and N = 7 due
530 to random responses on filler items).
531 The stimulus materials were the same as in Experiment
532 1. Unlike in Experiment 1, the nine questions were
533 grouped into three sets: Biological (Q1, Q2, and Q3 as de-
534 scribed in Experiment 1), Psychological Set 1 (Q4, Q5,
535 and Q6), and Psychological Set 2 (Q7, Q8, and Q9). Each
536 participant received only one of the three groups of ques-
537 tions (N = 41 for Biological, N = 38 for Psychological Set 1,
538 N = 36 for Psychological Set 2). The six psychological
539 questions were split into two groups to equate the total
540 number of questions received across all participants. Sam-
541 ple sizes were determined by power analyses on the data
542 from Experiment 1, with 95% power subject to a mini-
543 mum of 40 participants per condition (prior to excluding
544 random responders and repeat participants).
545 Results and discussion
546 We conducted a 2 × 3 mixed-model ANOVA on each par-
547 ticipant’s mean across items, with framing (concrete or ab-
548 stract) as a within-subjects factor and attribution type
549 (Biological, Psychological Set 1, or Psychological Set 2) as
550 a between-subjects factor. This analysis revealed the pre-
551 dicted interaction, F(2,112) = 54.83, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.50, as
552 shown in Fig.F2 2a. Biological attributions were higher for
553the abstract (M = 5.31, SD = 1.20) than for the con-
554crete versions (M = 4.67, SD = 1.25), t(40) = −7.47, p <
5550.001, d = −1.67. Conversely, psychological attributions
556were higher for the concrete than for the abstract ver-
557sions, both for Psychological Set 1 (M = 5.08, SD = 1.51
558vs. M = 4.55, SD = 1.96), t(37) = 3.44, p = 0.001, d = 0.56,
559and for Psychological Set 2 (M = 3.83, SD = 1.21 vs. M
560= 2.52, SD = 1.17), t(35) = 8.36, p < 0.001, d = 1.38. As
561shown in Fig. 2b, the difference scores (concrete minus
562abstract) were significant in the predicted direction for
563eight of the nine measures (p < 0.05, two-tailed; cogni-
564tive factors reached marginal significance in the pre-
565dicted direction, p < 0.10).
566The interaction effect also held up in a by-item analysis.
567A 2 (abstract or concrete) × 2 (psychological or biological)
568repeated measures ANOVA on the item means revealed a
569significant interaction, F(1,5) = 22.51, p = 0.005, ηp
2 = 0.15.
570Biological attributions were higher for the abstract ver-
571sions (M = 5.31, SD = 0.26) than for the concrete versions
572(M = 4.67, SD = 0.64), t(5) = −3.04, p = 0.029, d = −1.24,
573while psychological attributions were significantly higher
f2:1Fig. 2 Results of Experiment 2. a Judgments of the biological and
f2:2psychological bases of disordered behaviors rated between-subject; bars
f2:3depict Cousineau–Morey standard errors (Cousineau, 2005; Morey, 2008).
f2:4b The 95% confidence intervals of the difference scores (concrete minus
f2:5abstract) for ratings on the nine dependent measures. “Biological Causes”
f2:6in (a) are the averaged ratings of the first three dependent mea-
f2:7sures listed in (b), “Psychological Set 1 Causes” the second three,
f2:8and “Psychological Set 2 Causes” the last three
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574 for the concrete versions (M = 4.45, SD = 0.84) than for
575 the abstract versions (M = 3.54, SD = 0.28), t(5) = 3.90, p =
576 0.011, d = 1.59.
577 These results show that the strong shifts in attribution
578 shown in Experiment 1 cannot have occurred due to de-
579 mand to inversely rate biological and psychological causes.
580 Rather, these shifts occur independently, reflecting both a
581 stronger belief in biological causation in the abstract and a
582 stronger belief in psychological causation in the concrete.
583 Experiment 3
584 In Experiment 3, we tested whether the effect of abstract
585 versus concrete framing on biological versus psycho-
586 logical attributions might have a downstream effect on
587 the perceived efficacy of treatments for mental disorders.
588 Such a finding would have implications both for psychi-
589 atric intervention and for public health, since perceived
590 treatment efficacy can influence actual treatment efficacy
591 (Meyer et al., 2002).
592 People believe that medication is more effective for
593 disorders that they perceive to be biologically based and
594 that psychotherapy is more effective for those they per-
595 ceive as psychologically based (e.g. Iselin & Addis, 2003;
596 Luk & Bond, 1992; Yopchick & Kim, 2009). We there-
597 fore predicted that medication would be seen as more
598 effective in treating symptoms described abstractly ra-
599 ther than concretely, since abstract descriptions were
600 more compatible with biological explanations (Experi-
601 ments 1 and 2). Put differently, making an effect (e.g. a
602 mental disorder) appear to be more biologically caused
603 (e.g. by neurotransmitter imbalances) should make bio-
604 logical interventions on that causal system (e.g. medica-
605 tion) appear more effective. In contrast, since concrete
606 framing makes psychological explanations more avail-
607 able, psychological interventions (e.g. psychotherapy)
608 should appear more effective with concrete rather than
609 abstract framing.
610 Method
611 We recruited 40 participants from Amazon Mechanical
612 Turk. Participants made judgments about the abstract and
613 concrete versions of the same items used in Experiments
614 1 and 2. However, rather than judging explanations, they
615 rated the extent to which they believed psychotherapy
616 would be an effective treatment and the extent to which
617 they believed medication would be an effective treatment,
618 on separate scales from 1 (“not at all”) to 9 (“completely”).
619 Participants were told that psychotherapy refers to “treat-
620 ment by psychological means, involving repeated verbal
621 interactions between a clinician and a client,” and that
622 medication refers to “treatment by psychiatric, psy-
623 choactive, or psychotropic drugs.” These judgments were
624 always made on the same page and their order was coun-
625 terbalanced so that some participants always made
626medication judgments first and other participants always
627made psychotherapy judgments first. The abstract versus
628concrete framing was a within-subject factor with the
629order of the items counterbalanced as in Experiment 1, so
630that the abstract and concrete versions of the same item
631would appear in separate halves of the experiment.
632Results and discussion
633We conducted a 2 (concrete or abstract) × 2 (medication
634or psychotherapy) repeated-measures ANOVA on indi-
635vidual participants’ means across items. This analysis re-
636vealed the predicted interaction, F(1,39) = 9.61, p = 0.004,
637ηp
2 = 0.20, as shown in Fig. F33. Medication was judged
638more effective when the disorder was framed abstractly
639(M = 5.71; SD = 1.64) rather than concretely (M = 5.22;
640SD = 1.60), t(39) = 3.70; p = 0.001; d = 0.58. However,
641judgments of the effectiveness of psychotherapy did not
642reliably differ between the abstract (M = 6.57; SD = 1.18)
643and concrete versions (M = 6.66; SD = 1.13), t(39) = 0.79,
644p = 0.43, d = 0.13.
645When behaviors are described more abstractly, and
646biological explanations thereby seem more plausible
647(as shown in Experiments 1 and 2), the current results
648suggest that people come to believe that biological inter-
649ventions on that causal system are more likely to influence
650those behaviors. These results generalize the effect of ab-
651stract and concrete framing on biological attributions to a
652new measure. That said, it is difficult to say whether or
653not the effect on treatment decisions is statistically medi-
654ated by attributions, since the effect was found for medi-
655cation but not for psychotherapy. A test for mediation
656would require a design that measured both attributions
657and treatments simultaneously.
658Why did the effect not extend to psychotherapy effi-
659cacy judgments? Although it is possible that this oc-
660curred because the effect of abstract/concrete framing
661on psychological explanations is less stable than the ef-
662fect on biological explanations, we think this is not the
f3:1Fig. 3 Mean judgments of medication and psychotherapy treatment
f3:2efficacy in Experiment 3. Bars depict Cousineau–Morey standard
f3:3errors (Cousineau, 2005; Morey, 2008)
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663 most likely explanation. The abstractness manipulation
664 was sufficient to find robust differences for both psycho-
665 logical and biological explanations in Experiments 1 and
666 2 and this same manipulation was used here in Experi-
667 ment 3. Instead, the null effect on psychotherapy judg-
668 ments is likely the result of a ceiling effect: Participants’
669 judgments for the psychotherapy items were between 6.5
670 and 7 on a nine-point scale, which may be at ceiling
671 given people’s moderate perceptions of the degree to
672 which psychotherapy has the potential to be effective
673 (Jorm, 2012; Ten Have et al., 2010). In contrast, people
674 know much less about psychotropic medications (Jorm,
675 2012); thus, for medication judgments they may rely
676 more on their perceptions of the biological basis of the
677 items, as shifted by the framing effect demonstrated in
678 Experiment 3.
679 Experiment 4
680 Experiments 1–3 showed that biological and psycho-
681 logical attributions shift depending on abstract versus
682 concrete framing not only for clinicians (as shown in
683 Kim et al., 2016), but for laypeople as well, and across a
684 wide range of specific psychological and biological
685 causes. However, these experiments leave unanswered
686 the question of whether these attribution shifts would
687 also occur across a wider range of human behaviors.
688 Mental disorders may be something of a special case, be-
689 cause both clinicians and laypeople are accustomed to
690 hearing both psychological and biological levels of ex-
691 planation for disordered behaviors. Experiments 4 and 5
692 tested whether such shifts would also occur for behav-
693 iors which are more closely within the range of familiar
694 human experience, but which are somewhat out of the
695 ordinary and hence seem in need of an explanation.
696 Method
697 Participants
698 Forty-nine lay participants were recruited via Amazon
699 Mechanical Turk, of whom ten were excluded (N = 2
700 due to taking similar studies in the past and N = 8 due
701 to random responses on filler items).
702 Materials and pretest
703 We picked eight everyday behaviors, including both
704 positively and negatively valenced behaviors. All of these
705 behaviors were realistic and required some explanation
706 (e.g. having difficulty focusing on tasks for a long time;
707 staying calm during a competitive situation; see TableT2 2
708 for a list of all stimuli). To show that the effect arises
709 when people are thinking about everyday behaviors,
710 we avoided highly rare behaviors, such as behaviors
711 that were extremely positive (e.g. memorizing 100-digit
712 matrices on a single viewing) or extremely negative (e.g.
713 committing serial murder). In addition, to circumvent
714ceiling or floor effects, we avoided using behaviors for the
715main test items that would likely be perceived as very
716strongly biologically caused (e.g. breathing).
717For each behavior, we developed an abstract version by
718describing the behavior as being common to a group of
719people. Each abstract version started with “Some people…”
720and described the behavior as generally applied to them
721without presenting any idiosyncratic variations. For the cor-
722responding concrete version, we specified a person with a
723first name and instantiated the behaviors in the context of
724that particular person using concrete terms. The two ver-
725sions were roughly equated for length (see Table 1).
726As for Experiment 1, we conducted a pretest of these
727items to determine whether the abstract and concrete
728versions of each behavior were perceived to correspond
729to each other as intended. We recruited a separate group
730of 41 participants for this pretest, of whom five were ex-
731cluded for failing the attention check. Of the remaining
73236 pretest participants, 18 judged whether the abstract
733version was “a good abstract description” of the concrete
734version on a scale of 1–9 (where 1 = a very poor descrip-
735tion; 9 = a very good description), yielding a mean rating
736of 7.61 (SD = 0.26). A separate group of 18 participants
737judged whether the concrete version was “a good ex-
738ample” of the abstract version on a scale of 1–9 (where
7391 = a very poor example; 9 = a very good example), yield-
740ing a mean rating of 7.99 (SD = 0.23). Mean ratings by
741behavior were all at least 7.33.
742Procedure
743The main experiment used the same measures as Exper-
744iments 1 and 2. The procedure was the same as Experi-
745ment 1, except that each participant made judgments for
746only half of the items in Table 2, in order to keep the
747length of the experiment reasonable. As in Experiment
7481, the items were counterbalanced so that the abstract
749and concrete versions of the same item appeared in sep-
750arate halves of the experiment.
751Results
752Each participant’s biological (α = 0.95, calculated by item)
753and psychological (α = 0.85) attributions were averaged
754separately. We conducted a 2 (concrete or abstract) × 2
755(biological or psychological) repeated measures ANOVA
756on each participant’s mean across items. This analysis re-
757vealed the predicted interaction, F(1,38) = 33.95, p < 0.001,
758ηp
2 = 0.47, as shown in Fig. F44a. Biological attributions
759were higher for the abstract versions (M = 4.81, SD =
7601.22) than for the concrete versions (M = 4.42, SD =
7611.12), t(38) = −4.36, p < 0.001, d = −0.70, while psy-
762chological attributions were higher for the concrete ver-
763sions (M = 6.04, SD = 0.84) than for the abstract versions
764(M = 5.65, SD = 0.93), t(38) = 4.84, p < 0.001, d = 0.78.
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765 As shown in Fig. 4b, the effects for each component
766 measure were directionally consistent with our predictions
767 and with previous experiments, but were somewhat more
768 variable. Although six of the nine measures reached signifi-
769 cance at the p < 0.05 level (two-tailed t-test against 0), one
770 biological factor reached marginal significance (brain struc-
771 ture; p < 0.10), and two psychological factors did not signifi-
772 cantly differ from 0 (cognitive factors and personality; see
773 below for discussion).
774 The interaction effect also held up in a by-item ana-
775 lysis, using each item’s mean score across participants.
776 A 2 (abstract or concrete) × 2 (biological or psycho-
777 logical) repeated measures ANOVA on these scores re-
778 vealed the predicted interaction, F(1,7) = 16.62, p =
779 0.005, ηp
2 = 0.70. Biological attributions were higher for
780 the abstract versions (M = 4.81, SD = 0.83) than for the
781 concrete versions (M = 4.42, SD = 0.83), t(7) = −4.27, p
782 = 0.004, d = −1.51, while psychological attributions were
783 higher for the concrete versions (M = 6.04, SD = 0.58)
784 than for the abstract versions (M = 5.65, SD = 0.90), t(7)
785 = 2.65, p = 0.033, d = 0.94.
786Discussion
787Experiment 4 found that shifts in attribution occur not
788only for mental disorders, but for a much broader range
789of human behaviors. These shifts were consistent across
790the three biological measures (albeit marginally signifi-
791cantly for brain structures), but somewhat more variable
792across the psychological measures. Although four of our
793psychological measures shifted significantly in the pre-
794dicted direction, two others—cognitive factors and per-
795sonality—did not.
796Since all psychological measures shifted significantly in
797Experiments 1 and 2 depending on framing, it is worth
798considering why shifts were not seen for cognitive fac-
799tors and personality in Experiment 4. We speculate that
800these somewhat less consistent effects of psychological
801attributions may be due in part to a weaker manipula-
802tion of abstractness that we used in Experiment 4, com-
803pared to Experiments 1–3. Whereas those previous
804experiments described the behaviors at the level of a cat-
805egory (a mental disorder) that did not invoke any indi-
806viduals, Experiment 4 described the behaviors in terms
t2:1 Table 2 Stimuli for Experiments 4 and 5
t2:2 Behavior Text version
t2:3 Concrete Abstract
t2:4 1. Having extra-
t2:5 marital affairs
Douglas has been regularly sleeping with his ex-girlfriend at a
local hotel; he has created an elaborate lie to tell his wife,
claiming that he has to spend evenings and weekends away
from the house doing extra work for his unreasonable boss.
Some men have extra-marital affairs; they have an ongoing
sexual relationship with someone other than their spouse,
typically without their spouse’s knowledge, and they fre-
quently engage in deceptive behaviors to cover up these
actions.
t2:6 2. Having a great
t2:7 memory for names
Denise memorized the names of all of the students in her 85-
person lecture course within the first couple of class meetings
and she spent only a little extra time outside of class review-
ing their names and photographs.
Some people have a great memory for names; they can learn
to match a large number of names to faces under conditions
of limited time, all without seeming to undergo an
extraordinary amount of mental effort.
t2:8 3. Being nervous in
t2:9 social settings
Cheryl gets nervous at all of the company dinners and parties
she is expected to attend with her colleagues; she worries
about whether she sounds intelligent and whether her dress,
hair, and makeup look right.
Some people are nervous in social settings; when they are
placed in any situation in which they are expected to mingle
with other people, including people they already know, they
get worried and anxious.
t2:10 4. Staying calm
t2:11 during a competitive
t2:12 situation
Allen stays calm during his figure skating performance in
international competition; he lands all of his difficult jumps
perfectly while under tremendous pressure to do well on
behalf of his country.
Some people stay calm during a competitive situation; they
are able to perform well despite being under a considerable
amount of pressure to live up to the expectations of others
and themselves.
t2:13 5. Having difficulty
t2:14 focusing on tasks for
t2:15 a long time
Raymond has difficulty focusing on writing the sales
presentations required by his job; he repeatedly stops
working to chat with co-workers, shop online, and watch viral
YouTube videos.
Some people have difficulty focusing on tasks for a long time;
their attention wanders and they engage in alternative
activities that do not advance their work on the task at hand.
t2:16 6. Drinking too much Martin frequently drinks too many tequila shots; he knows
that his system can really only handle one per hour, but
always drinks at least three times that amount, vomits, and
then has terrible hangovers the next day.
Some people drink too much; they knowingly ingest more
alcohol than their digestive systems can adequately process
in a short span of time, and do so more frequently than is
advisable for maximum wellbeing.
t2:17 7. Tending to be
t2:18 optimistic about the
t2:19 future
Sharon tends to be optimistic about her career trajectory; she
anticipates that her own performance will be excellent and
expects to get good job assignments and eventual
promotions.
Some people tend to be optimistic about the future; they
approach the world with positive expectations about what
events will happen in the future and how those events will
unfold.
t2:20 8. Being very driven
t2:21 to achieve
Thomas is very intent on becoming a top executive at his
corporation; he works 18-h days and has never missed a work
meeting, although he has missed many of his children’s
sports games and recitals.
Some people tend to be very driven to achieve; this involves
putting the vast majority of their time, effort, and mental
focus on achieving their goals and paying relatively less
attention to other areas of life.
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807 of a group of individuals engaging in the behavior. Because
808 even the abstract versions referred to human agents, they
809 might have somewhat triggered psychological explana-
810 tions. Furthermore, people may consider cognitive factors
811 (e.g. beliefs and intelligence) and personality to be more
812 immutable than the other, more transient psychological
813 factors we tested, such as emotions and intentions. None-
814 theless, significant shifts were still obtained for a majority
815 of our measures of psychological attribution—and all mea-
816 sures of biological attribution (at least marginally signifi-
817 cantly)—testifying to the robustness of the attributional
818 shifts in the face of this weaker manipulation.
819 Experiment 5
820 Experiment 5 sought to replicate the framing effects on
821 attributions for ordinary behaviors, using a between-
822 subjects design as in Experiment 2.
823 Method
824 Two hundred and forty participants were recruited via
825 Amazon Mechanical Turk, of whom 21 were excluded
826(N = 9 due to taking similar studies in the past and N =
82712 due to random responses on filler items). Thus, data
828from 219 participants were used for the analyses.
829The stimulus materials were the same as in Experi-
830ment 4. The design and the procedure were the same as
831in Experiment 2 in that participants received either the
832Biological (N = 36), the Psychological Set 1 (N = 145), or
833the Psychological Set 2 (N = 38) questions. Sample sizes
834were determined by power analyses on the data from Ex-
835periment 4, with 95% power subject to a minimum of 40
836participants per condition (prior to excluding random
837responders and repeat participants).
838Results and discussion
839We conducted a 2 × 3 mixed-model ANOVA on each
840participant’s mean across items, with framing (concrete
841or abstract) as a within-subjects factor and attribution
842(Biological, Psychological Set 1, or Psychological Set 2)
843as a between-subjects factor. This analysis revealed the
844predicted interaction, F(1,228) = 51.15, p < 0.001, ηp
2 =
8450.31, as shown in Fig. F55a. Biological attributions were
846higher for the abstract (M = 5.29, SD = 1.11) than for the
847concrete versions (M = 4.57, SD = 1.34), t(35) = −6.81, p <
8480.001, d = −1.13, whereas the responses to the Psycho-
849logical Set 2 questions were higher for the concrete (M =
8506.71, SD = 0.74) than for the abstract versions (M = 6.24,
851SD = 0.95), t(37) = 5.16, p < 0.001, d = 0.84. The responses
852to the Psychological Set 1 questions did not differ between
853the concrete and abstract versions (M = 6.27, SD = 0.85 vs.
854M = 6.22, SD = 0.85), t(144) = 1.18, p = 0.24, d = 0.10,
855because cognitive abilities and personality—the two
856psychological measures that did not reach significance in
857Experiment 1—were unaffected by the manipulation. (See
858Fig. 5b for the 95% confidence intervals of the difference
859scores for each measure.) Again, we suspect that these less
860consistent effects on psychological attributions may be at-
861tributable to the weaker manipulation of abstractness used
862in Experiments 4 and 5, compared to Experiments 1–3,
863perhaps in conjunction with a tendency to view cognitive
864and personality factors as more immutable than the other
865psychological factors. Importantly, however, the effects on
866psychological attributions were significant overall and
867consistent for four of the six measures.
868The interaction effect also held up in a by-item ana-
869lysis. A 2 (abstract or concrete) × 2 (biological or psycho-
870logical) repeated measures ANOVA on the item means
871revealed a significant interaction, F(1,7) = 38.80, p <
8720.001, ηp
2 = 0.85. Biological attributions were higher for
873the abstract versions (M = 5.26, SD = 0.69) than for the
874concrete versions (M = 4.54, SD = 0.87), t(7) = −5.33, p =
8750.001, d = −1.88, while psychological attributions were
876marginally higher for the concrete versions (M = 6.50,
877SD = 0.45) than for the abstract versions (M = 6.25, SD =
8780.71), t(7) = 2.15, p = 0.069, d = 0.76. Follow-up analyses
f4:1 Fig. 4 Results of Experiment 4. a Judgments of the biological and
f4:2 psychological bases of everyday behaviors rated within-subject; bars
f4:3 depict Cousineau–Morey standard errors (Cousineau, 2005; Morey,
f4:4 2008). b The 95% confidence intervals of the difference scores
f4:5 (concrete minus abstract) for ratings on the nine dependent mea-
f4:6 sures. “Biological Causes” in (a) are the averaged ratings of the first three
f4:7 dependent measures listed in (b), and “Psychological (Sets 1 & 2) Causes”
f4:8 are the averaged ratings of the last six dependent measures listed in (b)
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879 conducted separately on the two sets of psychological
880 measures showed that this marginally significant effect on
881 psychological attributions occurred because concrete
882 items were rated significantly higher than abstract items
883 on the Psychological Set 2 measures (M = 6.74, SD = 0.91
884 vs. M = 6.28, SD = 1.15), t(7) = 2.49, p = 0.041, d = 0.88,
885 while the concrete and abstract items were rated similarly
886 on the Psychological Set 1 measures (M = 6.27, SD = 0.33
887 vs.M = 6.22, SD = 0.45), t(7) = 0.59, p = 0.57, d = 0.21.
888 In sum, the results of Experiment 5 fully replicate the
889 findings of Experiment 4, where biological attributions
890 were consistently stronger in the abstract and psycho-
891 logical attributions were typically stronger in the con-
892 crete (with two of six measures failing to reach
893 significance). Finding these same effects in a between-
894 subjects design shows that the framing shifts cannot be
895 due to a perceived demand to rate the psychological and
896 biological explanations inversely.
897 General discussion
898 In daily life, people often describe behaviors at differing
899 levels of abstraction—as abstract generalizations across
900 individuals or as concrete behaviors of individuals. We
901 hypothesized that this distinction between abstract and
902 concrete framing would lead to different explanatory
903preferences; namely, a stronger preference for biological
904explanations in the abstract and more reluctance to
905accept biological explanations for concrete cases.
906The results across Experiments 1, 2, 4, and 5 corrobo-
907rated this hypothesis. Both in contemplating disordered
908(Experiments 1 and 2) and everyday behaviors (Experi-
909ments 4 and 5), participants generally judged explana-
910tions in terms of genetics, neural chemistry, and brain
911structure to be more appropriate when faced with ab-
912stract descriptions of behavior than when faced with
913concrete cases. These differing explanatory stances also
914had downstream consequences such that people pre-
915ferred a more “biological” intervention (medication) for
916treating disorders when described abstractly than when
917described in terms of a concrete case (Experiment 3).
918It should also be noted that our claims are only about
919whether endorsement of biological and psychological ex-
920planations was influenced by abstract descriptions rela-
921tive to concrete descriptions. Thus, we are not claiming
922that abstract framing would increase endorsement of
923biological explanations to the extent that they would be
924preferred to psychological explanations. In fact, this was
925not the case in Experiments 3–5. Similarly, we are not
926claiming that concrete framing would make psycho-
927logical explanations be endorsed more than biological
928explanations; again, the current results failed to show
929that consistently (Experiments 1 and 2). Preferences for
930biological versus psychological explanations can vary
931greatly simply due to the nature of the events. For in-
932stance, “Don is full of himself” would be difficult to ex-
933plain in terms of biological factors and thus although an
934abstract framing like “Some people are full of them-
935selves” may make biological accounts more plausible,
936psychological accounts may still be more dominant than
937biological accounts even in the abstract framing.
938In addition, we acknowledge that other factors may in-
939fluence the availability of biological versus psychological
940explanations, including individual differences in theory
941of mind (Baron-Cohen, 1997), cognitive reflectiveness
942(Frederick, 2005), or even a desire to blame others for
943their behavior (Clark et al., 2014). We do not mean to
944downplay the importance of other potential factors, but
945rather seek to argue that the abstract/concrete distinc-
946tion plays a key role.
947Possible mechanisms
948In the introduction, we briefly presented two explanations
949for this framing effect. First, abstract framing, which con-
950veys general patterns, triggers the need for more immut-
951able explanations (e.g. Cimpian & Salomon, 2014), and
952biological properties are judged to be immutable and
953timeless (e.g. Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011; Lebowitz et al.,
9542013) just like generic abstract framing. Second, previous
955studies found that people more strongly attribute
f5:1 Fig. 5 Results of Experiment 5. a Judgments of the biological and
f5:2 psychological bases of everyday behaviors rated between-subjects;
f5:3 bars depict Cousineau–Morey standard errors (Cousineau, 2005;
f5:4 Morey, 2008). b The 95% confidence intervals of the difference
f5:5 scores (concrete minus abstract) for ratings on the nine dependent
f5:6 measures. “Biological Causes” in (a) are the averaged ratings of the first
f5:7 three dependent measures listed in (b), “Psychological Set 1 Causes”
f5:8 the second three, and “Psychological Set 2 Causes” the last three
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956 behaviors to free will when the events are described in
957 more concrete contexts (e.g. Nichols & Knobe, 2007). We
958 acknowledge that there are also other possible mecha-
959 nisms for this framing effect and we briefly discuss three
960 here: an inverse relationship between psychological and
961 biological judgments, dualist thinking, and the influence
962 of formal education.
963 Inverse relationship between psychological and biological
964 judgments
965 People have been shown to behave as though biological
966 and psychological explanations have an inverse relation-
967 ship. That is, people sometimes behave as though factors
968 making one kind of explanation more plausible corres-
969 pondingly make the other kind less plausible (e.g. Preston,
970 Ritter, & Hepler, 2013; see also Ahn, Proctor, & Flanagan,
971 2009 for similar findings with clinicians). Thus, salient
972 psychological explanations for concrete cases may add-
973 itionally suppress biological explanations and salient bio-
974 logical explanations for abstract cases may also
975 additionally suppress psychological explanations. In that
976 sense, this belief in an inverse relationship is not by itself
977 an explanation for our effects because there should be an
978 initial mechanism for making biological explanations sali-
979 ent for abstract cases or psychological explanations salient
980 for concrete cases. Yet, once biological explanations be-
981 come salient for abstract framing (due to, for instance,
982 biological explanations being compatible with generic ab-
983 stract framing), it may make psychological explanations
984 less salient for abstract framing.
985 Dualist thinking
986 Recent work has explored the possibility that people are
987 intuitive mind–body dualists, who believe that the mind
988 and brain are separate entities (e.g. Bloom, 2007; For-
989 stmann, Burgmer, & Mussweiler, 2012; Hood, Gjersoe, &
990 Bloom, 2012; Hook & Farah, 2013). Whereas philoso-
991 phers of mind hold that biology and psychology repre-
992 sent separable levels of analysis, such explanations are
993 usually seen as complementary (e.g. Dennett, 1971). Lay-
994 people may instead see these explanations as competing
995 (e.g. Preston et al., 2013)—a form of dualism that is not
996 inconsistent with the current findings.
997 The current results could also help to explain previous
998 framing effects in judgments of free will. Nichols and
999 Knobe (2007) found that people often endorse determin-
1000 ism in the abstract, but are more inclined toward belief in
1001 free will for individuals (Nichols & Knobe, 2007). Our re-
1002 sults suggest one possible explanation for this result—that
1003 people are dualists in the sense that they do not juxtapose
1004 biological and psychological explanations, but rather treat
1005 them as competing explanations, privileging one over the
1006 other depending on the context. Our findings suggest that
1007 people may be subtly drawn to physicalism, the claim that
1008everything is physical or is necessitated by the physical,
1009more strongly in the abstract than in the concrete.
1010That said, our results do not present any direct dem-
1011onstrations of Cartesian dualism, the claim that mind
1012and body are distinct substances. We collected partici-
1013pants’ dualists beliefs at the end of Experiments 1 and 4,
1014presenting them with the dualism scale from Stanovich
1015(1989), and found that the framing effects did not correl-
1016ate with people’s dualist beliefs. In this scale, participants
1017judged their agreement with 27 statements (e.g. “the
1018mind and the brain are two totally separate things;” “in a
1019hundred years or more, it might make sense to refer to a
1020computer as having a mind”) on a 5-point scale. For
1021each participant, we computed the correlation between
1022their scores on this dualism scale and the extent to
1023which they showed the framing effect. As an index of
1024framing effects, we added each participant’s difference
1025score (i.e. concrete minus abstract) for psychological at-
1026tributions to the opposite sign difference score (i.e. ab-
1027stract minus concrete) for biological attributions. This
1028provides an estimate of the interactive effect of concrete-
1029ness/abstractness on psychological and biological attri-
1030butions for each participant. The average correlation
1031between the dualism scale and the framing effect was
1032significantly negative in Experiment 1, r(41) = −0.38, p =
10330.013, and failed to reach significance in Experiment 3,
1034r(37) = 0.34, p = 0.16. Taken together, these findings speak
1035against the possibility that those who are more likely to
1036endorse mind–body dualism are more likely to be subject
1037to the abstract/concrete framing effect. Nonetheless, these
1038null results should be taken with caution, in part because
1039the dualism scale may have become a less valid measure
1040of dualist beliefs in recent years. That is, the pervasiveness
1041of biological accounts of human behaviors may have made
1042laypeople deny mind–body dualism when confronted ex-
1043plicitly, as is the case in the dualism scale. Future research,
1044using more implicit measures of dualism, can help us bet-
1045ter understand the shape and the scope of dualist beliefs
1046that laypeople hold.
1047Context-sensitivity of intuitive and formal theories
1048People hold lay theories across many domains that differ
1049dramatically from more formal scientific theories, in-
1050cluding theories in biology (Shtulman, 2006), physics
1051(McCloskey, 1983), statistics (Tversky & Kahneman,
10521971), economics (Furnham & Argyle, 1998), personality
1053(Haslam et al., 2004), decision theory (Johnson & Rips,
10542015), and emotion (Gilbert & Wilson, 2007). Further,
1055these lay theories often coexist in an individual’s mind
1056with their formal counterparts (Shtulman & Valcarcel,
10572012). Adults who have had many years of formal educa-
1058tion and who would have no difficulty endorsing the ap-
1059propriate scientific theory if asked explicitly nonetheless
1060show slower response times in verifying facts that have
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1061 different truth values on their formal and intuitive theor-
1062 ies (e.g. “fire is composed of matter” or “air is composed
1063 of matter”), compared to facts that have the same truth
1064 values on both theories (e.g. “rocks are composed of
1065 matter” or “numbers are composed of matter”). Indeed,
1066 under time pressure, expert biologists fall back on their
1067 intuitive theories of biology, according to which plants
1068 are non-living (Goldberg & Thompson-Schill, 2009) and
1069 expert physical scientists endorse teleological explana-
1070 tions for physical phenomena (e.g. “Trees produce oxy-
1071 gen so that animals can breathe”; Kelemen, Rottman, &
1072 Seston, 2013).
1073 Very little is known, however, about what circumstances
1074 lead individuals to apply their formal versus intuitive the-
1075 ories to a problem when these theories disagree. We
1076 speculate that people may be more likely to rely on their
1077 formal theories in the abstract and more likely to default
1078 to their earlier, intuitive theories in the concrete. This idea
1079 can provide a further mechanism for the current findings.
1080 Whereas folk psychology is a natural and early-emerging
1081 mode of explanation (e.g.Q5 Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Onishi
1082 & Baillargeon, 2005), brain-based biological explanations
1083 seem to emerge later (Johnson & Wellman, 1982). Further,
1084 people usually learn about biological explanations in an
1085 abstract format. For example, science-based websites for
1086 the public that explain the biological underpinnings of be-
1087 havioral disorders (e.g. from such authoritative bodies as
1088 the CDC, NIH, and Mayo Clinic) invariably describe what
1089 is known about each disorder in general, rather than de-
1090 scribing individual case studies. Student textbooks
1091 explaining the biology of behaviors and commercials mar-
1092 keting psychotropic medications often take the same ap-
1093 proach. Consequently, formally acquired biological
1094 explanations for behavior may seem relatively natural in
1095 the abstract, but people may default to their lay theories
1096 such as folk psychology in the concrete, accounting for
1097 our framing effect.
1098 One way to test the formal education hypothesis
1099 would be to ask whether an analogous effect arises in
1100 other domains. Would people apply different lay eco-
1101 nomic theories in contemplating one individual country
1102 versus countries in general? Would people apply differ-
1103 ent lay theories of evolution in contemplating one par-
1104 ticular species versus species in general? Would people
1105 give different advice about how to maximize happiness if
1106 the advice is applied to a particular person versus people
1107 in general? To the extent that formal and intuitive theor-
1108 ies may give different verdicts, these questions may be of
1109 considerable practical importance.
1110 A second way to test the hypothesis would be to con-
1111 duct developmental studies. Presumably, young children
1112 do not have a formal education in biology or neurosci-
1113 ence, so if the effect is indeed driven by formal educa-
1114 tion, it should not arise among young children. By
1115contrast, if the effect is driven by an intuition that bio-
1116logical explanations are tied to immutability and hence
1117essentialism, it might arise much earlier in develop-
1118ment. For instance, Cimpian and Markman (2011)
1119found that when asked to explain either generic state-
1120ments (e.g. boys are good at math) or non-generic
1121statements (e.g. Johnny is good at math), even four-
1122year-olds preferred to explain generic statements in terms
1123of inherent features (e.g. “because that’s how they’re
1124made”) than extrinsic features (e.g. “because they got tea-
1125ched”). This effect of genericity on intuitions about inher-
1126ence does not seem to require formal education, and if
1127our framing effects are driven by the same process, they
1128might be similarly early-emerging. On the other hand, our
1129results are more nuanced in that people distinguished be-
1130tween biological explanations and psychological explana-
1131tions, when both (or at least some of the psychological
1132explanations used in the current study) are treated as in-
1133herent and essentialized explanations in the previous de-
1134velopmental studies. This finer distinction may emerge
1135later in development as a result of learning biological the-
1136ories in the abstract context.
1137Implications for Public Health and Science Education
1138We found that, like clinicians (Kim et al., 2016), laypeople
1139endorse different explanations for mental disorders in the
1140abstract and in the concrete (Experiments 1 and 2), which
1141can even lead to different treatment recommendations
1142(Experiment 3). These results have implications for public
1143communication about mental disorders. Biological expla-
1144nations of psychopathology lead people to essentialize
1145mental disorders (e.g. Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011; Haslam
1146& Ernst, 2002), to distance themselves from or reduce em-
1147pathy toward people who have mental disorders (Lebowitz
1148& Ahn, 2014; Read, Haslam, Sayce, & Davies, 2006), and
1149to be more pessimistic about mental disorder prognoses
1150(Deacon & Baird, 2009; Kvaale, Haslam, & Gottdiener,
11512013). At the same time, however, these explanations can
1152ameliorate stigma by reducing personal blame for mental
1153disorder symptoms (e.g. Deacon & Baird, 2009). These
1154studies, along with the current results, suggest that, de-
1155pending on the goal of communication, it may be best to
1156use either abstract or concrete descriptions. One should
1157use concrete descriptions if one wishes to de-essentialize
1158mental illness or improve perceived prognosis and ab-
1159stract descriptions if one wishes to reduce blame for the
1160symptoms.
1161Our finding also has implications for science education
1162more broadly. Science educators have long debated the
1163relative value of abstract and concrete teaching materials
1164(see Fyfe, McNeil, Son, & Goldstone, 2014 for a review).
1165Concrete materials have both advantages (e.g. they may be
1166more likely to utilize real-world knowledge; Schliemann &
1167Carraher, 2002) and disadvantages (e.g. they can also
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1168 distract with extraneous perceptual details; Belenky &
1169 Schalk, 2014); yet abstract materials, too, have their own
1170 benefits (e.g. they emphasize structural features over
1171 superficial features; Uttal, O’Doherty, Newland, Hand, &
1172 DeLoache, 2009) and pitfalls (e.g. mindless symbol ma-
1173 nipulation; Nathan, 2012). It is often noted that because of
1174 these complementary advantages and disadvantages, the
1175 use of both kinds of materials is necessary. However, our
1176 results suggest another critical difference between these
1177 types of materials—whereas the use of biological explana-
1178 tions (acquired through science education) may be rela-
1179 tively natural in an abstract setting, students may fall back
1180 on their psychological explanations in concrete settings.
1181 This highlights the need, not only to expose students to
1182 both kinds of teaching materials, but to map the connec-
1183 tions between concrete problems and their abstract logical
1184 structure, if educators hope for the biological explanations
1185 they are teaching to their students to be generalized to the
1186 concrete world.
1187 Conclusion
1188 We explain human behaviors in multiple ways. We can
1189 emphasize the importance of responsibility, controllability,
1190 intentions, beliefs, and desires. We can also explain human
1191 behavior in terms of biological forces, such as genes, neural
1192 chemistry, and brain structure. Our results showed that
1193 biological theories of behavior are more privileged when
1194 contemplating abstract descriptions rather than concrete
1195 cases. Thus, even though abstract and concrete descriptions
1196 of behavior are both ubiquitous in the world, and often
1197 seemingly equivalent, they can nonetheless lead to very dif-
1198 ferent inferences about the causes underlying the behavior.
1199 Endnotes
1200 1Although the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Associ-
1201 ation, 2013) is the most recent version of the manual,
1202 DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000)
1203 was the only version available at the time we developed
1204 these materials. Nevertheless, any statements made in
1205 this paper in reference to the DSM-IV-TR are also valid
1206 in terms of the DSM-5, as the particular symptoms we
1207 used remain in the DSM-5.
1208 Funding
1209 This work was supported by NIH Grants R01MH57737 and R01HG007653 to
1210 Woo-kyoung Ahn.
1211 Competing interests
1212 The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
1213 Authors’ contributions
1214 W.A. and J.K. originated the project idea. N.S.K., S.G.B.J., and W.A. wrote the
1215 stimulus materials, which were critically revised by J.K. Programming and
1216 data collection were performed by S.G.B.J. and W.A.; S.G.B.J., W.A., and N.S.K.
1217 performed data analyses. N.S.K. wrote the initial manuscript draft; S.G.B.J.,
1218 W.A., and J.K. made critical additions and revisions. All authors contributed to
1219 data interpretation and additional revisions of the manuscript. All authors
1220 approved the manuscript for submission.
1221 Q6Ethics approval and consent to participate
1222Experiments 1–5 were conducted with the formal approval of the Yale
1223University and Northeastern University Institutional Review Boards. All
1224participants voluntarily gave informed consent.
1225Author details
12261Department of Psychology, Northeastern University, 125 Nightingale Hall,
1227360 Huntington Avenue, Boston, MA 02115, USA. 2Department of
1228Psychology, Yale University, Box 208205, New Haven, CT 06520-8205, USA.
12293Department of Philosophy, Yale University, 344 College Street, New Haven,
1230CT 06511, USA.
1231Received: 14 September 2016 Accepted: 3 February 2017
1232
1233References
1234Ahn, W., Proctor, C. C., & Flanagan, E. H. (2009). Mental health clinicians’ beliefs
1235about the biological, psychological, and environmental bases of mental
1236disorders. Cognitive Science, 33, 147–182.
1237American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of
1238mental disorders (5th ed.). Washington, DC: Author.
1239American Psychiatric Association. (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of
1240mental disorders (4th ed., text revision). Washington, DC: Author.
1241 Q8Aspinwall, L. G., Brown, T. R., & Tabery, J. (2012). The double-edged sword: Does
1242biomechanism increase or decrease judges’ sentencing of psychopaths?
1243Science, 337, 846–849.
1244Barnhill, J. W. (Ed.). (2013). DSM–5 clinical cases. Washington, DC: American
1245Psychiatric Publishing.
1246Baron-Cohen, S. (1997). Mindblindness: An essay on autism and theory of mind.
1247Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
1248Belenky, D. M., & Schalk, L. (2014). The effects of idealized and grounded
1249materials on learning, transfer, and interest: an organizing framework for
1250categorizing external knowledge representations. Educational Psychology
1251Review, 26(1), 27–50.
1252 Q9Bering, J. M. (2002). Intuitive conceptions of dead agents’ minds: The natural
1253foundations of afterlife beliefs as phenomenological boundary. Journal of
1254Cognition and Culture, 2(4), 263–308.
1255 Q10Bering, J. M. (2006). The folk psychology of souls. Behavioral and Brain Sciences,
125629(5), 453–462.
1257Bloom, P. (2007). Religion is natural. Developmental Science, 10, 147–151.
1258Borgida, E., & Nisbett, R. E. (1977). The differential impact of abstract vs. concrete
1259information on decisions. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 7(3), 258–271.
1260Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. (2011). Amazon’s Mechanical Turk: A
1261new source of inexpensive, yet high-quality, data? Perspectives on
1262Psychological Science, 6, 3–5.
1263 Q11Buss, D. M., & Schmitt, D. P. (1993). Sexual strategies theory: an evolutionary
1264perspective on human mating. Psychological Review, 100(2), 204–232.
1265Cimpian, A., & Erickson, L. C. (2012). The effect of generic statements on
1266children’s causal attributions: Questions of mechanism. Developmental
1267Psychology, 48(1), 159–170.
1268Cimpian, A., & Salomon, E. (2014). The inherence heuristic: An intuitive means of
1269making sense of the world, and a potential precursor to psychological
1270essentialism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 37(05), 461–480.
1271Clark, C. J., Luguri, J. B., Ditto, P. H., Knobe, J., Shariff, A. F., & Baumeister, R. F.
1272(2014). Free to punish: A motivated account of free will belief. Journal of
1273Personality and Social Psychology, 106, 501–513.
1274Corrigan, P. W., & Watson, A. C. (2004). At issue: Stop the stigma: Call mental
1275illness a brain disease. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 30(3), 477–479.
1276Cousineau, D. (2005). Confidence intervals in within-subjects designs: A simpler
1277solution to Loftus and Masson’s method. Tutorials in Quantitative Methods for
1278Psychology, 1, 42–45.
1279Dar-Nimrod, I., & Heine, S. J. (2011). Genetic essentialism: On the deceptive
1280determinism of DNA. Psychological Bulletin, 137, 800–818.
1281Deacon, B. J., & Baird, G. L. (2009). The chemical imbalance explanation of
1282depression: reducing blame at what cost? Journal of Social and Clinical
1283Psychology, 28(4), 415–435.
1284Dennett, D. C. (1971). Intentional systems. Journal of Philosophy, 68(4), 87–106.
1285Eells, T. D., Kendjelic, E. M., & Lucas, C. P. (1998). What’s in a case formulation?
1286Development and use of a content coding manual. Journal of Psychotherapy
1287Practice and Research, 7(2), 144–153.
Kim et al. Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications _#####################_ Page 15 of 17
1288 Forstmann, M., Burgmer, P., & Mussweiler, T. (2012). “The mind is willing, but the
1289 flesh is weak”: The effects of mind-body dualism on health behavior.
1290 Psychological Science, 23, 1239–1245.
1291 Frederick, S. (2005). Cognitive reflection and decision making. Journal of Economic
1292 Perspectives, 19(4), 25–42.
1293 Furnham, A., & Argyle, M. (1998). The psychology of money. New York, NY:
1294 Psychology Press.
1295 Fyfe, E. R., McNeil, N. M., Son, J. Y., & Goldstone, R. L. (2014). Concreteness fading
1296 in mathematics and science instruction: a systematic review. Educational
1297 Psychology Review, 26(1), 9–25.
1298 Gilbert, D. T., & Wilson, T. D. (2007). Prospection: Experiencing the future. Science,
1299 317(5843), 1351–1354.
1300 Goldberg, R. F., & Thompson-Schill, S. L. (2009). Developmental “roots” in mature
1301 biological knowledge. Psychological Science, 20(4), 480–487.
1302Q12 Gripshover, S. J., & Markman, E. M. (2013). Teaching young children a theory of
1303 nutrition: Conceptual change and the potential for increased vegetable
1304 consumption. Psychological Science, 24(8), 1541–1553.
1305 Haslam, N., Bastian, B., & Bissett, M. (2004). Essentialist beliefs about personality and
1306 their implications. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30(12), 1661–1673.
1307 Haslam, N., & Ernst, D. (2002). Essentialist beliefs about mental disorders. Journal
1308 of Social and Clinical Psychology, 21(6), 628–644.
1309 Hood, B., Gjersoe, N. L., & Bloom, P. (2012). Do children think that duplicating the
1310 body also duplicates the mind? Cognition, 125, 466–474.
1311 Hook, C. J., & Farah, M. J. (2013). Look again: Effects of brain images and mind-
1312 brain dualism on lay evaluations of research. Journal of Cognitive
1313 Neuroscience, 25, 1397–1405.
1314 Howard, R. (Director). (2001). A beautiful mind [film]. Universal City, CA:
1315 Universal Studios.
1316 Iselin, M. G., & Addis, M. E. (2003). Effects of etiology on perceived helpfulness of
1317 treatments for depression. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 27(2), 205–222.
1318 Jenni, K., & Loewenstein, G. (1997). Explaining the identifiable victim effect.
1319 Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 14(3), 235–257.
1320 Johnson, C. N., & Wellman, H. M. (1982). Children’s developing conceptions of the
1321 mind and brain. Child Development, 53, 222–234.
1322 Johnson, S. G., & Rips, L. J. (2015). Do the right thing: The assumption of
1323 optimality in lay decision theory and causal judgment. Cognitive Psychology,
1324 77, 42–76.
1325 Jorm, A. F. (2012). Mental health literacy: empowering the community to take
1326 action for better mental health. American Psychologist, 67(3), 231–243.
1327Q13 Kelemen, D., Emmons, N. A., Schillaci, R. S., & Ganea, P. A. (2014). Young children
1328 can be taught basic natural selection using a picture-storybook intervention.
1329 Psychological Science, 25(4), 893–902.
1330 Kelemen, D., Rottman, J., & Seston, R. (2013). Professional physical scientists display
1331 tenacious teleological tendencies: Purpose-based reasoning as a cognitive
1332 default. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 142(4), 1074–1083.
1333 Kim, N. S., Ahn, W., Johnson, S. G. B., & Knobe, J. (2016). The influence of framing
1334 on clinicians’ judgments of the biological basis of behaviors. Journal of
1335 Experimental Psychology: Applied, 22(1), 39–47.
1336 Kvaale, E. P., Haslam, N., & Gottdiener, W. H. (2013). The ‘side effects’ of
1337 medicalization: A meta-analytic review of how biogenetic explanations affect
1338 stigma. Clinical Psychology Review, 33(6), 782–794.
1339 Lamb, W. (2008). I know this much is true: A novel (P.S.). New York, NY: Harper
1340 Perennial.
1341 Lebowitz, M. S., & Ahn, W. (2014). Effects of biological explanations for mental
1342 disorders on clinicians’ empathy. Proceedings of the National Academy of
1343 Sciences, 111(50), 17786–17790.
1344 Lebowitz, M. S., Ahn, W., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (2013). Fixable or fate? Perception
1345 of the biology of depression. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 81,
1346 518–527.
1347 Luk, C., & Bond, M. H. (1992). Chinese lay beliefs about the causes and cures of
1348 psychological problems. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 11, 140–157.
1349Q14 Maglio, S. J., & Trope, Y. (2012). Disembodiment: Abstract construal attenuates the
1350 influence of contextual bodily state in judgment. Journal of Experimental
1351 Psychology: General, 141, 211–216.
1352 Malle, B. F., & Knobe, J. (1997). The folk concept of intentionality. Journal of
1353 Experimental Social Psychology, 33(2), 101–121.
1354Q15 Mandelbaum, E., & Ripley, D. (2012). Explaining the abstract/concrete paradoxes
1355 in moral psychology: the NBAR hypothesis. Review of Philosophy and
1356 Psychology, 3(3), 351–368.
1357 McCloskey, M. (1983). Naive theories of motion. In D. Gentner & A. L. Stevens
1358 (Eds.), Mental models (pp. 299–324). New York, NY: Psychology Press.
1359Meyer, B., Pilkonis, P. A., Krupnick, J. L., Egan, M. K., Simmens, S. J., & Sotsky, S. M.
1360(2002). Treatment expectancies, patient alliance and outcome: Further
1361analyses from the National Institute of Mental Health Treatment of
1362Depression Collaborative Research Program. Journal of Consulting and Clinical
1363Psychology, 70(4), 1051–1055.
1364 Q16Miresco, M. J., & Kirmayer, L. J. (2006). The persistence of mind-brain dualism in
1365psychiatric reasoning about clinical scenarios. American Journal of Psychiatry,
1366163, 913–918.
1367Morey, R. D. (2008). Confidence intervals from normalized data: A correction to
1368Cousineau (2005). Tutorials in Quantitative Methods for Psychology, 4, 61–64.
1369Murray, D., & Nahmias, E. (2014). Explaining away incompatibilist intuitions.
1370Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88, 434–467.
1371 Q17Nadelhoffer, T., Gromet, D., Goodwin, G., Nahmias, E., Sripada, C., & Sinnott-Armstrong,
1372W. (2013). The mind, the brain, and the law. In T. A. Nadelhoffer (Ed.), The future of
1373punishment (pp. 193–211). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
1374Nathan, M. J. (2012). Rethinking formalisms in formal education. Educational
1375Psychologist, 47(2), 125–148.
1376Nichols, S., & Knobe, J. (2007). Moral responsibility and determinism: The
1377cognitive science of folk intuitions. Noûs, 41, 663–685.
1378O’Connor, C., & Joffe, H. (2013). How has neuroscience affected lay
1379understandings of personhood? A review of the evidence. Public
1380Understanding of Science, 22(3), 254–268.
1381Pescosolido, B. A., Martin, J. K., Lang, A., & Olafsdottir, S. (2008). Rethinking
1382theoretical approaches to stigma: A framework integrating normative
1383influences on stigma (FINIS). Social Science & Medicine, 67(3), 431–440.
1384 Q18Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life. (2010). Religion among the millennials.
1385Washington, DC: Pew Research Center.
1386Preston, J. L., Ritter, R. S., & Hepler, J. (2013). Neuroscience and the soul:
1387Competing explanations for the human experience. Cognition, 127, 31–37.
1388 Q19Proctor, C. (2008). Clinicians’ and laypeople’s beliefs about the causal basis and
1389treatment of mental disorders. (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). New
1390Haven, CT: Yale University.
1391 Q20Qualtrics Labs, Inc. (2005). Qualtrics Labs, Inc. (Version 39660) [Computer software].
1392Provo, UT: Author.
1393 Q21Racine, E., Waldman, S., Rosenberg, J., & Illes, J. (2010). Contemporary
1394neuroscience in the media. Social Science & Medicine, 71(4), 725–733.
1395Read, J., Haslam, N., Sayce, L., & Davies, E. (2006). Prejudice and schizophrenia: a
1396review of the ‘mental illness is an illness like any other’ approach. Acta
1397Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 114(5), 303–318.
1398Schliemann, A. D., & Carraher, D. W. (2002). The evolution of mathematical
1399reasoning: Everyday versus idealized understandings. Developmental Review,
140022(2), 242–266.
1401 Q22Schomerus, G., Schwahn, C., Holzinger, A., Corrigan, P. W., Grabe, H. J., Carta, M. G.
1402, …Angermeyer, M. C. (2012). Evolution of public attitudes about mental
1403illness: A systematic review and meta-analysis. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica,
1404125(6), 440–452.
1405Semin, G. R., & Fiedler, K. (1991). The linguistic category model, its bases,
1406applications and range. European Review of Social Psychology, 2(1), 1–30.
1407Shtulman, A. (2006). Qualitative differences between naïve and scientific theories
1408of evolution. Cognitive Psychology, 52(2), 170–194.
1409Shtulman, A., & Valcarcel, J. (2012). Scientific knowledge suppresses but does not
1410supplant earlier intuitions. Cognition, 124, 209–215.
1411Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2008). Abstract + concrete = paradox. In J. Knobe & S.
1412Nichols (Eds.), Experimental Philosophy (pp. 209–230). Oxford: Oxford
1413University Press.
1414Spitzer, R. L., Gibbon, M., Skodol, A. E., Williams, J. B. W., & First, M. B. (2002). DSM-
1415IV-TR casebook: A learning companion to the diagnostic and statistical manual
1416of mental disorders (4th ed.) Text Revision. Washington, DC: American
1417Psychiatric Association.
1418Stanovich, K. E. (1989). Implicit philosophies of mind: The dualism scale and its
1419relation to religiosity and belief in extrasensory perception. Journal of
1420Psychology, 123, 5–23.
1421Ten Have, M., De Graaf, R., Ormel, J., Vilagut, G., Kovess, V., Alonso, J., …the
1422ESEMeD/MHEDEA 2000 Investigators. (2010). Are attitudes towards mental
1423health help-seeking associated with service use? Results from the European
1424Study of Epidemiology of Mental Disorders. Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric
1425Epidemiology, 45(2), 153–163.
1426 Q23Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2003). Temporal construal. Psychological Review,
1427110(3), 403–421.
1428 Q24Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2010). Construal-level theory of psychological distance.
1429Psychological Review, 117, 440–463.
Kim et al. Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications _#####################_ Page 16 of 17
1430 Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1971). Belief in the law of small numbers.
1431 Psychological Bulletin, 76(2), 105–110.
1432 Uttal, D. H., O’Doherty, K., Newland, R., Hand, L. L., & DeLoache, J. (2009). Dual
1433 representation and the linking of concrete and symbolic representations.
1434 Child Development Perspectives, 3(3), 156–159.
1435 Waytz, A., Gray, K., Epley, N., & Wegner, D. M. (2010). Causes and consequences of
1436 mind perception. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14, 383–388.
1437 Weiner, B. (1995). Judgments of responsibility: A foundation for a theory of social
1438 conduct. New York, NY: Guilford.
1439 Weiner, B. (2001). Responsibility for social transgressions: An attributional analysis.
1440 In B. F. Malle, L. J. Moses, & D. A. Baldwin (Eds.), Intentions and intentionality:
1441 Foundations of social cognition (pp. 331–344). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
1442 Yopchick, J. E., & Kim, N. S. (2009). The influence of causal information on
1443 judgments of treatment efficacy. Memory & Cognition, 37, 29–41.
1444Q25 Young, L. J. (2009). Being human: Love: Neuroscience reveals all. Nature,
1445 457(7226), 148.
1446
Submit your manuscript to a 
journal and benefi t from:
7 Convenient online submission
7 Rigorous peer review
7 Immediate publication on acceptance
7 Open access: articles freely available online
7 High visibility within the fi eld
7 Retaining the copyright to your article
    Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropen.com
1448
1449
Kim et al. Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications _#####################_ Page 17 of 17
